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How Deep is the Annuity Market  
Participation Puzzle? 
 





Using UK microeconomic data, we analyze the empirical determinants of voluntary annuity 
market demand. We find that annuity market participation increases with financial wealth, 
life expectancy and education and decreases with other pension income and a possible 
bequest motive for surviving spouses. We then show that these empirically-motivated 
determinants of annuity market participation have the same, quantitatively important, 
effects in a life-cycle model of annuity and life insurance demand, saving and portfolio 
choice. Moreover, reasonable preference parameters predict annuity demand levels 
comparable to the data. For stockholders, a relatively strong bequest motive is sufficient to 
simultaneously generate balanced portfolios and low annuity demand. 
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Why are annuities not voluntarily taken up by a larger number of retirees? In the individual
consumption/savings-portfolio choice literature, a very important participation puzzle arises
from the revealed preference of households not to voluntarily buy annuities at retirement,
despite the strong theoretical reasons that point towards high demand for these products.
Speci￿cally, as early as 1965, Yaari demonstrates that risk aversion is su¢ cient to induce a
household to buy an actuarially fair annuity as protection against life expectancy risk. Yet,
despite this strong theoretical result,1 annuity demand remains very low in the data, what
is known as the ￿annuity market participation puzzle￿ .
It is important to understand why this puzzle arises from a theoretical perspective2 but
there is also another, equally strong, empirical reason to explain the puzzle. Speci￿cally, there
has been a large shift in pension provision from de￿ned bene￿t (DB) to de￿ned contribution
(DC) plans both in the U.S. and in the U.K.. DB plans o⁄er not only a ￿xed monthly
payment but also o⁄er it for life, therefore providing a natural insurance for life expectancy
risk. On the other hand, DC plans place the decision of how fast to decumulate during
retirement in the hands of the individual.3 As a result, the issue of annuity provision could
become very important for ￿nancial planning after retirement.
The pressing need to understand this puzzle has generated a large number of potential
explanations. One prominent idea involves the lack of actuarially fair annuities. Mitchell et
al. (1999) for the U.S. and Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) for the U.K make the case
but on the other hand Mitchell et. al. (1999) also argue that annuity pricing is not su¢ cient
to explain the low take-up because the ￿money￿ s worth of individual annuities￿is actually
quite good. Moreover, the presence of some annuitization through state social security and
private DB plans (Bernheim (1991), Brown et. al. (2001) and Dushi and Webb (2004)), and
1More recently, Davido⁄ et al. (2005) show that complete annuitization is optimal in a more general
setting than Yaari (1965) when markets are complete.
2Davido⁄ et. al. (2005) imply that an explanation from the psychology and economics literature might
be needed.
3In the U.K. during the sample period of the data used in this paper (2002-2004) there was mandatory
annuitization by age 75 of three quarters of the accumulated assets in a DC plan.
1the presence of uncertain medical expenditures (for instance, Sinclair and Smetters (2004)
and Ameriks et. al. (2007)) have recently received substantial attention as determinants of
annuity demand. Furthermore, the lack of ￿ exibility in purchasing an annuity has also been
recently emphasized by Milevsky and Young (2007) who argue that buying an annuity limits
household ￿ exibility to invest in the stock market, while Ameriks et. al. (2007) instead focus
on the implications of irreversible annuity purchase decisions on the probabilities of ending
up at a nursing home funded by the state. They argue that such ￿medicaid-aversion￿may
explain why households do not commit to the illiquid expenditure of buying an annuity.
Flexibility in labor supply along with the existing annuity in the form of social security is
the explanation o⁄ered by Benitez-Silva (2003) in a quantitative model. Another prominent
idea is the presence of a bequest motive as the preference for leaving bequests may coun-
teract the insurance bene￿ts of annuities (Friedman and Warshawsky (1990)). Nevertheless,
the lack of evidence stemming from comparing the choices of households with and without
children (for example, Brown (2001)) has cast doubt on the empirical plausibility of this
explanation. Other less prominent explanations include in￿ ation risk,4 habit formation in
preferences,5 non-actuarially fair annuity provision combined with minimum annuity size
purchase requirements,6 and rare events.7
Our primary contribution is to take many of the reasons for lower annuity holdings
previously proposed in the literature and combine them in a quantitative model, while si-
multaneously checking that the empirical evidence is consistent with the inputs to, and
predictions from, the model. Our strategy will be to ￿rst empirically examine which expla-
nations can provide some empirical evidence for annuity market decisions. Next, we utilize
4In the presence of substantial in￿ ation risk the demand for nominal annuities might be quite low. Nev-
ertheless, this explanation would imply a large demand for real annuities, yet the take-up for real annuities,
where they exist, has also been low. Lopes (2006) also ￿nds that the load factors for real annuities are high,
thereby negating the value from having real annuities.
5Davido⁄, Brown and Diamond (2005).
6See Lopes (2006).
7Lopes and Michaelides (2007) argue that the possibility of a ￿rare event￿like the default of the annuity
provider cannot by itself explain the puzzle since such a rare event would change behavior for high risk
aversion coe¢ cients but a high risk aversion simultaneously makes annuity demand stronger.
2a comprehensive quantitative model that allows us to assess the ability of di⁄erent, empir-
ically motivated, determinants to explain the observed empirical regularities. Thus, both
our empirical (reduced form) and our estimated (structural) model can shed light on which
explanations are more likely to justify the low annuity market participation in the data.
To achieve the stated goal we ￿rst empirically analyze the determinants of voluntary annu-
ity market participation at the household level to determine the characteristics of households
that participate (or not) in this market. We con￿rm that there appears to be a substantial
voluntary annuity market participation puzzle, since less than 6% of households participate
in this market. For our multivariate empirical analysis, we separate the sample between
stockholders and non-stockholders. We take this route because wealthier and more educated
households can better a⁄ord and understand annuities, and because we know that stock
market participation increases with wealth and education (for instance, Campbell (2006)).
Indeed, the annuity market participation rate for stockholders (9:6%) is three times the
participation rate of non-stockholders (3:2%). In all regressions, we ￿nd that the factors
determining participation are broadly the same for both groups. Speci￿cally, annuity mar-
ket participation increases with life expectancy, education and ￿nancial wealth. Pension
income (or compulsory annuity income) crowds out annuity demand conditional on volun-
tary annuity market participation, while a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses is
a hurdle for voluntary annuitization. We view these empirical ￿ndings as interesting in their
own right since they increase our understanding of the factors determining annuity market
participation.
Surprisingly, there are not many empirical studies investigating the correlates of annuity
market participation.8 One similar recent study is Brown (2001) who has a similar research
objective based on the U.S. equivalent of the U.K. data we use, but instead focuses on ￿rst
calculating the value of having access to an annuity market for each household (based on
a life-cycle simulated model) and then relates this value to the intention to annuitize. The
two approaches yield similar insights with regards to some of the empirical correlates of
8Recently, Brown and Poterba (2006) study variable (or equity-linked) annuities and focus on the impact
of the household￿ s marginal tax rate. Nevertheless, variable annuities only recently developed to a signi￿cant
part of the total annuity market.
3annuity market participation. For instance, as in Brown (2001) we do not ￿nd any evidence
for a bequest motive when using the presence of children as a variable to proxy for an
intentional bequest motive. Like Brown, we ￿nd a statistically and economically signi￿cant
negative impact of being married on the probability to annuitize. With respect to other
variables, our results di⁄er from Brown￿ s results. For instance, education and subjective
survival probabilities turn out to be signi￿cant in our analysis while they are insigni￿cant
in Brown (2001). Most importantly, we ￿nd that wealth has a strong positive impact on
the probability to annuitize while it turns out negative and signi￿cant in Brown￿ s analysis.
Moreover, Brown (2001) does not consider portfolio choice arguments, while we also consider
the impact of stock and life insurance market participation on the probability to annuitize.
We next construct a quantitative model that may replicate these empirical ￿ndings, and
that can therefore be used to quantify the strength of the annuity market participation puz-
zle. Speci￿cally, we build a model of life-cycle saving, portfolio, life insurance and annuity
market choice with Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences over a non-durable good and investigate
whether reasonable preference parameters can replicate the observed annuity market partic-
ipation rate, and the level of annuity demand. To do so, we use the wealth distribution and
median pension level in the data as exogenous inputs to generate predicted annuity demand
after retirement. We ￿nd that preference parameters like risk aversion, the strength of the
bequest motive, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the decision to access the
stock market are key determinants of the model￿ s quantitative predictions. Financial wealth,
a key endogenous state variable in the model, is directly a⁄ected by these parameters and
is therefore a key predictor variable in assessing the model￿ s quantitative implications. Con-
trary to frictionless theoretical models, we ￿nd that many households should not purchase an
annuity partly because of the state pension income, partly because of the empirical wealth
distribution (many households cannot a⁄ord an annuity), partly because of the bequest mo-
tive, and partly because of better opportunities and ￿ exibility in saving through the stock
market.
We next use a method of simulated moments to estimate the model separately for stock-
holders and non-stockholders. We separate the two groups both on account of our mul-
tivariate probit ￿ndings and due to the large di⁄erence in ￿nancial wealth pro￿les across
4the two groups in the data.9 For the non-stockholders, we ￿x the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion to two and we estimate the bequest parameter and the intertemporal rate of
substitution, to match the annuity and life insurance participation rates, and, conditional
on annuity market participation, the amount of annuities purchased. For the stockholders
we add the average share of wealth in stocks during retirement as a moment target and
estimate the risk aversion coe¢ cient as well. We ￿nd that the life-cycle model is consistent
with the empirical ￿ndings for reasonable preference speci￿cations. The estimated elasticity
of intertemporal substitution is much lower for non-stockholders (0:08) than for stockholders
(0:72). We view these parameter estimates as reasonable estimates for preferences, being
consistent with the empirical evidence in, for instance, Gourinchas and Parker (2002), and,
in particular, Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
For both stockholders and non-stockholders, we need a bequest motive but this motive
needs to be stronger for stockholders. The e⁄ect of a strong bequest motive in generating a
balanced portfolio comprised of both stocks and bonds has not been stressed in the literature
as a su¢ cient ingredient to explain portfolio allocations. Here, the bequest motive can
generate a much slower decumulation of wealth during retirement, while for the same reason
it can generate balanced portfolios. In the absence of a bequest motive, both ￿nancial
wealth and the implicit riskless assets (annuities and state pensions) are being depleted at
similar rates. A bequest motive, however, breaks the decumulation of ￿nancial wealth and
therefore generates a balanced portfolio even at retirement. The need for a bequest motive
to explain the data is consistent with recent evidence like De Nardi (2004) who emphasizes
the e⁄ect for matching the observed wealth distribution and Kopczuk and Lupton (2007)
who use this motive to better understand U.S. wealth data during retirement. Our results
are also consistent with Yogo (2008) who needs a bequest motive to generate low welfare
9We do not model the endogenous decision of whether to participate or not in the stock market. Gomes
and Michaelides (2005) and Alan (2006) calibrate and estimate, respectively, a life-cycle model and show
that households with low ￿nancial wealth can be kept out of the stock market with a small ￿xed cost. Given
that in our data the households that do not participate in the stock market are much poorer in terms of
￿nancial wealth than stock market participants, we think that a small ￿xed cost will keep these households
out of the stock market as well. We do not model this endogenous choice explicitly here to keep the model
relatively simple.
5gains from annuity market participation in a model with health investments for the U.S.
Health and Retirement Survey. Overall, comparing the predictions of the model with their
empirical counterparts we ￿nd that reasonable calibrations can generate the low annuity
demand observed in the data and that, therefore, the annuity market participation puzzle
might not be as deep as previously thought.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the multi-
variate probit (reduced form) results on the actual determinants of annuity market demand
(de￿ned as annuity market participation and the level of annuity demand conditional on
participation). In Section 3 we perform a number of comparative statics exercises from a
calibrated life-cycle model to understand what a quantitative model predicts about the annu-
ity market. In Section 4 we estimate the structural parameters of this model and investigate
the strength of the annuity market participation puzzle by comparing the moments in the
data to the ones from the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Dataset
The empirical part of the paper is based on the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(ELSA). ELSA is a biannual panel survey among those aged 50 and over (and their younger
partners) living in private households in England in 2002. For most of the variables of
interest we use data from the ￿rst wave of ELSA collected in 2002 and 2003. We restrict
our analysis to households with either a retired single, or a couple with at least one retired
person, since annuitization is likely to occur during retirement and we are interested in
possible substitution e⁄ects between public and private pension income and annuities.10 It
is vital to focus on voluntary annuitization, which is recorded in ELSA as a part of the
￿Income and Assets￿module. The survey gives a de￿nition of annuity income, which should
10With this restriction, we exclude 2,206 non-retired households. We do not view this restriction as
important for our analysis since we only observe 14 voluntary annuity contracts for these households in the
￿rst wave of ELSA.
6prevent any misinterpretation: ￿Annuity income is when you make a lump sum payment to
a ￿nancial institution and in return they give you a regular income for the rest of your life.￿
Some further details are provided in Appendix A.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
2.2.1 Annuities
Table 1 describes the annuity market participation decisions, and also presents a split of
this decision between households that participate, or not, in the stock market. We do this
based on the idea that stock market participation might be correlated with the decision to
participate in the annuity market, since both decisions require a certain level of ￿nancial
sophistication and ￿nancial wealth. According to Table 1, only 5:9% (309 observations) of
the households in our sample received income from voluntary annuitization in either the ￿rst
or second ELSA wave, illustrating ￿the annuity market participation puzzle￿ .
Table 1 also indicates that there might be an interesting correlation between the decision
to participate in the stock market and the decision to purchase an annuity. Stock market
participation11 is around 42:5% of the total sample but the percentage of stock market
participants purchasing an annuity (9:6%) is three times the percentage of stock market non-
participants (3:2%), with the di⁄erence highly statistically signi￿cant. Thus, there seems to
be some connection between the decision to participate in the two markets.
Table 2 presents annuity demand statistics conditional on participating in the voluntary
annuity market. Speci￿cally, the table reports mean and median annual annuity income,
also split across the stock market participation decision. Conditional on having an annuity,
the mean annual annuity income is about 3;000 GBP, but this is dominated by a number
of very large annuities as the median of about 1;000 GBP shows. Stock market participants
tend to demand higher annuities as indicated by a mean (median) annual annuity income of
about 3;650 (1;200) GBP.
11We de￿ne a stock market participant as a household that has stocks in an individual savings account
(ISA), or a personal equity plan (PEP), or indirect stock holdings in an investment trust, or direct holdings
of stocks. Indirect stock holdings in occupational or private pension schemes are not accounted for.
72.2.2 Life Insurance
Table 1 also provides participation rates in the life insurance market and this participation
rate equals 40%. Hence, participation in the life insurance market is much more pronounced
than participation in the voluntary annuity market. Given the inverse payout structure
of the two ￿nancial products - a life insurance is often called an inverse annuity - a joint
participation in both markets needs to be explained. There are no signi￿cant di⁄erences
between stockholder and non-stockholder life insurance participation rates (37:5% and 42:2%
respectively).
2.2.3 Wealth and Income
To be informative about annuity take-up decisions, ￿nancial wealth should be measured
before annuitization takes place. For annuities already observed in the ￿rst wave we capitalize
the value of the annuity by multiplying the annual annuity income with the annuity factor
and add this to the household￿ s ￿nancial wealth to get total ￿nancial wealth.12 Moreover,
observations without annuity income in the ￿rst wave, but with reported annuity income in
the second wave, must have purchased their annuity in the time between the two surveys.
By combining the second wave annuity information for these observations with the ￿rst wave
household variables, we achieve the desired match between the annuity and the household
characteristics immediately before voluntary annuitization occurs.
Table 2 reports the mean (median) ￿nancial wealth13 of annuitants to be about 135;000
(65;000) GBP, versus 50;000 (14;200) for non-annuitants, already suggesting the importance
of ￿nancial wealth in purchasing a voluntary annuity. More detailed evidence is displayed
12We use an annuity factor of 13. The annuity factor was calculated using the Financial Services Authority
comparative tables. These tables show the monthly payments o⁄ered by the main annuity providers under
the open market option. The monthly payments correspond to a purchase price of 100,000 GBP of a single
life annuity, with no guarantee, for a 65-year old male. We use the average monthly payment across providers
to calculate the corresponding annuity factor.
13Banks et al. (2007) provide evidence that British households do not reduce housing consumption with
increasing age because they stay in their original residence. Correspondingly, we do not use housing wealth
in our multivariate analysis because we view the relatively higher liquidity in ￿nancial wealth (with respect
to housing) as a more relevant criterion for the household decision to annuitize or not.
8in Figure 1. The ￿gure shows average voluntary annuity market participation across the
2:5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% and 97:5% percentiles of the wealth distribution. While
average participation is less than 1% in the bottom 5% of the wealth distribution, it increases
steeply to almost 20% in the top 5%. Given that the 10% and 25% percentiles of the wealth
distribution are 700 GBP and 3;300 GBP, respectively, it appears that these households
have insu¢ cient ￿nancial wealth to participate in the voluntary annuity market. Figure
1 also decomposes the sample across wealth percentiles into stock market non-participants
and participants. Almost all households around the 75%, 90% and 97:5% percentiles of the
wealth distribution are stock market participants. The mean (median) wealth of investors
who participate in both markets is 174;000 (100;000) GBP (Table 2), considerably larger
than the mean (median) wealth of annuity market participants.
The existence of other pension income o⁄ers another potential explanation for low an-
nuity market participation. The institutional details of the U.K. pension system have been
described elsewhere (for example, Blundell et al. (2002)) and we only summarize its main
features. The ￿rst tier of the public pension system is the Basic State Pension (BSP). The
second tier is earnings-related and can either be provided by the government or the private
sector. Both occupational and personal private sector pensions in the U.K. are subject to
compulsory annuitization laws (an annuity must be purchased within a certain time from
retirement) during the sample period. These compulsory annuities must be distinguished
from the voluntary annuities purchased from non-pension wealth that we focus on. Finkel-
stein and Poterba (2002) indicate that the compulsory annuity market in the U.K. is much
larger than the voluntary annuity market: in 1998 the former had a size of 5:4 billion GBP
versus 0:8 billion GBP for the latter.
Public pensions and the compulsory annuities from private pensions may be close sub-
stitutes for the voluntary annuity market. Indeed, Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) ￿nd
that the earnings-related tier of the U.K. public pension system serves as a perfect substi-
tute for private savings. Table 2 shows mean and median annual pensions for the whole
sample and di⁄erent sub-samples of annuity and stock market participants. While the level
of public pensions hardly changes over sub-samples, there is considerable variation in pri-
vate pensions. Annuity market participants receive higher private pensions (mean 7;236
9GBP; median 3;200 GBP) than annuity market non-participants (mean 4;362 GBP; median
1;350 GBP). Figure 2 decomposes the sources of pension income over di⁄erent percentiles
of the wealth distribution. The level of public pensions resembles a ￿ at pension, despite
the earnings-related tier of the system. This arises mostly from higher-earning employees
opting out from the public second tier (in Figure 2 private (compulsory) pensions increase
steeply over the wealth distribution). Compared to the level of public and private pensions,
voluntary annuities are small in magnitude and only exist around the 75%, 90% and 97:5%
wealth percentiles. Nevertheless, we cannot interpret these results as evidence against the
hypothesis that other pension income crowds out voluntary annuities, since other variables
(like ￿nancial wealth) need to be controlled for.
2.2.4 Health and Life Expectancy
Apart from wealth and existing pensions, an individual￿ s health condition and her life ex-
pectancy should also a⁄ect the decision to annuitize since annuities hedge longevity risk.
These products are in fact priced to re￿ ect the average life expectancy of annuity market
participants. If an individual has private information suggesting that she is unlikely to reach
the age of an average annuity market participant, she will not buy an annuity simply because
the product is overpriced for her. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) indeed ￿nd evidence
for adverse selection in the U.K.￿ s annuity market: participants in the voluntary annuity
market tend to live longer than non-participants. More generally, Rosen and Wu (2004) ￿nd
evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey that health status a⁄ects portfolio choice
and stock market participation. Since annuities are a form of ￿nancial product that is even
more explicitly linked to health status, we expect that health can be a strong predictor of
participation in the annuity market.
ELSA allows us to use subjective survival probabilities as a determinant of the annu-
itization decision. The questionnaire asks individuals of age less than, or equal to, 65 (69,
74, 79, 84 and 89) ￿What are the chances that you will live to be 75 (80, 85, 90, 95 and
100, respectively) or more?￿and gives a range from 0-100 for possible answers. We compare
these subjective survival probabilities with gender- and age-speci￿c objective survival prob-
10abilities from the Government Actuary￿ s Department tables (2006). We see from Table 3
that annuity market participants report a survival probability higher than non-participants
by ￿ve percentage points. The di⁄erence in objective GAD survival probabilities is three
percentage points and thus slightly smaller. These results are in line with the Finkelstein
and Poterba (2002, 2004) self-selection ￿ndings for the voluntary annuity market in the U.K
and will justify one of the comparative statics in the structural model where the subjective
survival probability is allowed to deviate from the objective one.
2.2.5 Socio-Economic Background
The ￿nal group of variables possibly a⁄ecting annuity market participation decisions is house-
hold composition and education. Education might matter since annuity products require
a basic level of ￿nancial literacy.14 We di⁄erentiate between three education levels: low,
medium and high. Table 3 shows that annuity market participants are on average much
better educated than non-participants. While 61% of the non-participants are in the lowest
education group, only one-third of all annuity holders are in the low education category.
For the high education level, the order changes: only 9% (25%) of non-participants (partici-
pants) have a higher education degree. We also investigate household composition to detect
a possible bequest motive, which might be a barrier for voluntary irreversible annuitization.
The unconditional statistics in Table 3 do not indicate that marital status or the number of
children vary between participants and non-participants.
2.3 Econometric Analysis
We investigate the household￿ s decision to participate in the voluntary annuity market and
the amount of purchased annuities conditional on participation in a multivariate regression
setup.
14Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) provide evidence that individuals planning for retirement generally exhibit
a higher degree of ￿nancial literacy than non-planning individuals.
112.3.1 Annuity Market Participation
Panel A of Table 4 displays the results of a Maximum Likelihood estimation of a Pro-
bit model for the household￿ s decision to participate in the voluntary annuity market or
not. The previous section revealed systematic di⁄erences between stock market participants
and non-participants, di⁄erences that might a⁄ect the annuitization decision. Therefore we
present estimation results for the two groups next to the estimation results for the whole
sample. We use as explanatory variables the following: wealth, income, life insurance market
participation, household composition, age, health and life expectancy of the household. The
regression for the whole sample contains in addition a stockholder dummy and its interac-
tion with ￿nancial wealth. In presenting the results, since the estimated coe¢ cient in the
probit model only shows the qualitative impact of an explanatory variable, we also compute
marginal e⁄ects to assess the quantitative impact in Panel B of Table 4. We do this for a
baseline observation that is de￿ned as a 65-year-old, single, male with medium education,
no children, no life insurance holding, average reported survival probability, average pension
income and ￿nancial wealth who does not participate in the stock market.
First, we note that the coe¢ cient of the stockholder dummy in Panel A of Table 4 is
negative with a con￿dence level of about 5%. However, the interaction of the stockholder
dummy with ￿nancial wealth is positive and signi￿cant. Taken together, the two coe¢ cients
imply a positive marginal e⁄ect of stock market participation with a t-value of 1.86 in
Panel B. Changing the baseline household from non-stockholder to stockholder, increases
the participation in the voluntary annuity market by 2:3 percentage points.
Con￿rming the earlier descriptive statistics in Table 2, ￿nancial wealth is shown to be one
of the most important predictors of annuity market participation.15 A unit increase in log
￿nancial wealth, which roughly corresponds to a 100% increase in ￿nancial wealth relative
to the baseline, signi￿cantly increases the annuity market participation probability for the
whole sample by 2:3 percentage points. The e⁄ect is larger in the stockholder sub-sample (5:7
percentage points) than in the non-stockholders sub-sample (1:8 percentage points). On the
15For all ￿nancial variables, we test for possible nonlinearities by including a squared term. This term
always turns out insigni￿cant.
12other hand, pension income turns out to be statistically insigni￿cant for both stockholders
and non-stockholders.
Turning to health and life expectancy, we ￿nd that the health indicators are insignif-
icant once we control for the subjective survival probabilities. Correspondingly, we only
include the self-reported survival probabilities in the regression, since these are a direct
measure of the longevity risk targeted by annuities. This variable a⁄ects di⁄erently the
annuitization decision of non-stockholders and stockholders. While statistically insigni￿cant
for non-stockholders, a ten percentage point increase in the baseline survival probability
of stockholders signi￿cantly increases the annuity market participation probability by 0:74
percentage points.
Married ￿nancial units are signi￿cantly less likely to purchase an annuity. The marginal
e⁄ect for the whole sample suggests that changing the marital status of the baseline house-
hold from single to married would signi￿cantly decrease the probability to participate in
the voluntary annuity market by 3:6 percentage points. The result is more pronounced in
the stockholder sub-sample than in the non-stockholder sub-sample. On the contrary, the
number of children (or the presence of children or grandchildren in alternative unreported
speci￿cations) does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect. This could mean that any bequest motive
focuses on the spouse and not on the children.16 Alternatively, the large impact of marital
status could be interpreted as intra-household hedging of longevity risk, instead of relying
on the annuity market. However, the explanatory ￿nancial wealth and pension income vari-
ables are measured on the household level and already comprise the wealth and income of
the spouse. Therefore, the bequest motive appears to be the more suitable explanation of
the importance of the marital status variable. The presence of a life insurance could be a
16The negative e⁄ect of being married could also be explained by ￿joint-and-last-survivor￿ or ￿joint-
survivor￿types of compulsory annuities, which provide payments until the death of the surviving spouse.
Usually, annuity payments are reduced by one half or one third after the death of the ￿rst annuitant (Blake,
1999). Brown and Poterba (2000) show that the utility gains from annuitization are smaller for couples than
for singles. ELSA does not provide details on the type of annuity a household has purchased. Stark (2003)
presents evidence on the importance of joint survivor annuities in the U.K. from a survey of 500 annuitants
in the compulsory market. She notes that only 12 percent of the annuities were of a joint type which suggests
a moderate demand.
13more direct measure of a bequest motive. However, the life insurance dummy variable turns
out insigni￿cant in all regressions which probably can be explained by a small number of
observations (105) which engage in both the annuity and the life insurance market.17
We include dummies for low and high education levels as a measure of ￿nancial literacy.
Changing the education level of the baseline household from medium to low signi￿cantly
decreases the participation probability in the whole sample by 2:9 percentage points. This
is a quantitatively large e⁄ect and underscores the importance of ￿nancial literacy.
2.3.2 Conditional Annuity Demand
We estimate a linear regression model for annuity demand measured in terms of log annual
annuity income on the whole sample and the two sub-samples of stock market (non-) partic-
ipants. Results are given in Table 4, Panel C. All non-￿nancial background variables appear
insigni￿cant in the conditional annuity demand regressions. These variables a⁄ect partici-
pation but do not in￿ uence demand conditional on participation. The ￿nancial variables,
however, remain signi￿cant predictors of annuity demand. The annuity demand elasticity
of ￿nancial wealth is 0.33 for the whole sample, and 0.32 (0.63) for the sub-samples of non-
stockholders (stockholders). While pensions do not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the annuity demand
of non-stockholders, they have a marginally statistically signi￿cant and negative impact for
stockholders. A 1% increase in compulsory annuities crowds out the demand for voluntary
annuities by 0.22%. The stockholder dummy and its interaction with ￿nancial wealth in
the regression based on the whole sample have the same signs as in the participation probit
model, but are only signi￿cant at the 10% level.
2.4 Summary
We provide an in depth empirical analysis of the voluntary annuity market participation
decision and the annuity demand conditional on participation. We recon￿rm that there
appears to be a substantial voluntary annuity market participation puzzle since less than 6%
17Using the amount of life insurance coverage instead of a life insurance dummy does not change this
result.
14of households participate in this market. Moreover, annuity market participation increases
with ￿nancial wealth, life expectancy and education. Pension income (or compulsory annuity
income) crowds out annuity demand conditional on voluntary annuity market participation,
while a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses is a hurdle for voluntary annuitization.
3 Understanding the Implications of a Life-Cycle Model
In the next two sections we investigate the implications of a life-cycle model of annuity
and life insurance demand and portfolio choice and assess the model￿ s consistency with the
empirical ￿ndings in the previous section. We ￿rst outline the most general version of the
model; special cases arise by limiting the choices available to households.
3.1 The Model
3.1.1 Bond and Stock Market
The household can save through a riskless asset and the stock market. We use rf to denote
the one period interest rate, e rt+1 the random return on the stock market and ￿t the share
of wealth in stocks, and assume that neither stocks nor bonds can be sold short, therefore
￿t has to lie between zero and one.
3.1.2 Annuity Contracts
We study nominal annuity contracts but for simplicity we assume zero in￿ ation.18 One
main component of the analysis involves calculating the expected present discounted value
(EPDV) of the annuity, since the insurance company uses this value to calculate the price
of the product. The EPDV will depend on the annual annuity payment, the survival proba-
bilities and the term structure of interest rates at the time of retirement. For instance, if at
retirement age the annualized interest rate on a bond with maturity t is rf, pt denotes the
18Recall that our data does not allow us to distinguish between nominal, real and variable annuities. While
all of these annuity products are available in the U.K., Stark (2002) shows that more than 70 percent of all
purchased annuities are of the nominal type.
15probability that the household is alive at date t, conditional on being alive at date t￿1 and
the household purchases one unit of annuity, the expected present discounted value (EPDV)






(1 + rf)j (1)
We use this EPDV to determine the cost of buying an annuity at retirement by multi-
plying the EPDV with one plus a load factor (P) which is greater than or equal to zero,
obtaining a measure of the ￿money￿ s worth￿of the annuity. If the load factor is zero, then
the annuity contract is actuarially fair and the ￿money￿ s worth￿equals one.19 Empirical ev-
idence by Mitchell et. al. (1999) illustrates that the load factor varies between 8% and 20%
depending on di⁄erent assumptions about discounting and mortality tables; a 20% value is
suggested as indicative of the transaction cost involved and this is the baseline value we use
in our calibration. Following the notation in Zeng (2008) we let the price of a unit annuity at
time (age) t be denoted by at. Following the empirical evidence with regards to the timing
of annuity purchases in our data set, we let households buy incremental annuities between
the retirement date (age 65) and age 80.20,21
3.1.3 Life Insurance Contracts
19The annuity premium/load factor (P) and the money￿ s worth are therefore de￿ned as:






20We know the age at which a ￿rst annuity is purchased for those 102 observation that were observed
without annuity in the ￿rst wave of ELSA but with an annuity in the second wave. Annuities are purchased
troughout retirement. 84% of the annuity purchases occur before or at the age of 80. 26% take place at the
state pension age or the year after.
21Life-cycle models which allow for gradual annuitization throughout retirement are proposed by Milevsky
and Young (2007), Horne⁄ et al. (2008), Zeng (2008), and Horne⁄ et al. (2009). The latter two papers
consider variable payout annuities. None of these papers attempts to estimate the structural parameters of
the life-cycle model to match observed annuitization behaviour.
16At time t the household can purchase term life insurance which will pay exp(rf) at time
(t+1) if death arrives next period. The actuarially fair price of one unit of the life insurance
product is then equal to (1￿pt)22. We use the same load factor as in the annuity market to
avoid biasing our results in one direction or the other from this choice. Therefore, the price
of life insurance equals
lt = (1 + Pl)(1 ￿ pt) (2)
3.1.4 Budget Constraint
During retirement the household has liquid ￿nancial wealth (cash on hand) Xt, which can
be used to purchase the annuity, the life insurance product and save through the bond or
the stock market. The household is also endowed with pension income in each period, L.
The annuity decision is irreversible, even though the household can add positive amounts
every period, while the household can also purchase only positive amounts of the life insur-
ance product. At time t (in the most general version of the model), there are three state
variables (age, cash on hand, and the amount of annuities) and four control variables (con-
sumption/saving, the share of wealth in stocks (￿t), the share of wealth invested in new
annuities (￿At) and the share of wealth allocated to the life insurance product (￿lt)).
Cash on hand evolves according to
Xt+1 = (Xt ￿ Ct)[￿t exp(e rt+1) + (1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿At ￿ ￿lt)exp(rf)] + L + At+1 (3)
If the individual dies in period t+1, then next period cash on hand is augmented by the life
insurance payout which equals ￿lt(Xt ￿ Ct)exp(rf)=lt but the household does not receive a
pension or an annuity payout in that instance23.
22With probability pt survival continues next period and the insurance gives a payout equal to zero. With
probability (1￿pt) the insurance pays out exp(rt+1;1) next period and therefore the current expected value
of life insurance equals (1 ￿ pt):
23Consistent with Zeng (2008) we ￿nd that the timing of the inheritance or, in the context of the model,
whether L and At+1 is received at the time of death, can a⁄ect substantially the behavior of the household
with an operable bequest motive. We think that this can be an interesting area for further research.
17The annuity evolves as





We model household saving, portfolio and annuity choices from retirement onwards at an
annual frequency. The household lives for a maximum of T (35) periods after retirement.
We allow for uncertainty in the age of death with pt+1 denoting the probability that the
household is alive at date t + 1, conditional on being alive at date t. Household preferences

















where ￿ is the time discount factor, b is the strength of the bequest motive,   is the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The
speci￿cation of the bequest motive is potentially a controversial issue in (5). Cocco et al.
(2005) and Yogo (2008) make a similar assumption, De Nardi (2004) and Lockwood (2009)
assume a more complicated version of this24, while Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) assume
that utility from leaving a bequest is linear in wealth. The state variables in each period
are current cash on hand, the annuity payment, and age. In each period t, t = 1;:::;T,
the household chooses optimal consumption Ct and the shares of saving allocated to new
annuities (￿At), the stock market (￿t) and the life insurance product (￿lt) with all shares
being between zero and one.
3.1.6 Wealth Distribution and Pension Income
To eventually compare the predictions of the model with the observed annuity demand and
participation rates, we need (among other exogenous inputs) an initial wealth distribution
and a reasonable pension level, and we take both of these from the data. At the same time,
based on our empirical results, we also condition these exogenous inputs on stock market
24The speci￿ed function in De Nardi (2004) is ￿1(1 + X
￿2)1￿￿:
18participation status and solve two di⁄erent models, one in which stock market participation
is allowed and another where access to the stock market does not exist, therefore requiring
di⁄erent inputs for wealth and pension income depending on the stock market participa-
tion status. We make this choice following the literature that has shown that wealth and
stock market participation are positively correlated and that, to a ￿rst approximation, non-
stockholders are poorer than stockholders so that a small ￿xed cost of participation can keep
non-stockholders out of the stock market (see, for example, Gomes and Michaelides (2005),
Alan (2006) or the evidence summarized in Guiso et al. (2002) and Campbell (2006)).
This assumption is consistent with our data with mean ￿nancial wealth at retirement for
stockholders being approximately four times the mean wealth of non-stockholders.25 Using
these exogenous inputs we start a simulation from age 65 onwards and for each age compute
the average annuity and life insurance participation rate, average portfolio demand and the
aggregate demand for annuities.26
3.1.7 Solution Technique and Other Parameters
This problem cannot be solved analytically. Given the ￿nite nature of the problem a solution
exists and can be obtained by backward induction, the numerical appendix o⁄ers some details
on the solution method. The maximum age that can be reached is 100, but agents will face
a probability of death each period. We assume a constant interest rate equal to 2%. The
mean equity premium is set at 4% with a standard deviation of 18%. In the baseline case
we use a CRRA preference speci￿cation with a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion equal to
3 (  = 1=3) while to illustrate the e⁄ect of the bequest motive on life insurance demand we
set b = 1:0:
25Median wealth di⁄erences are even more extreme with median wealth for non-stockholders being 5,000
GBP, while median wealth for stockholders equalling 48,000 GBP.
26To compute aggregate statistics we derive the demographic weights that would be implied by the survival
probabilities used by the household. We then weight each cohort by the respective demographic weight. The
conditional survival probabilities are taken from the U.K. GAD for 2002-2004.
193.2 Results
3.2.1 Annuity Policy Functions
We now report a series of comparative statics results to understand household choices ac-
cording to this model. Figure 3 plots the annuity demand choice at age 80 (the last year
for which annuity purchases are allowed) for stockholders and non-stockholders. For both
cases, the demand for annuities is zero for low wealth levels re￿ ecting mainly the annuity
in the form of pension income received during retirement. Higher wealth levels generate
an increasing demand for annuities over the early part of liquid wealth and decreasing at
higher levels of cash on hand and previously purchased annuities. From the shape of the
policy functions it should be noted that the wealth distribution is a necessary input before
pronouncing the presence of an annuity market participation puzzle. In an economy where
all households are very poor, the model predicts that no annuity demand will be generated
and therefore the lack of annuity market participation becomes a prediction of the model.
Moreover, stock market access makes the wealth level that warrants entry to the annuity
market generally higher. This is consistent with the idea that households might value the
￿ exibility that can be o⁄ered by investing in a higher mean return asset more than the se-
curity of an annuity payout.27 The result is consistent with Milevksy and Young (2007) who
point out the bene￿ts of maintaining the ￿ exibility of investing in the stock market.
Figure 4 plots (for non-stockholders) the three-dimensional annuity policy functions for
age 65 (the retirement age) and age 80 (the last year for which incremental annuities can
be purchased). The ￿gure illustrates a number of intuitions raised in the literature. First,
incremental annuitization is quite important as there are zero annuities purchased at retire-
ment whereas there is large participation rate at age 80. The di⁄erence between the two
ages implies (and this can be con￿rmed in unreported diagrams) that annuity market de-
mand gradually increases with older age. Second, the share of wealth invested in incremental
annuities is ￿rst increasing in wealth for a given annuity level and then decreases when a
27Variable annuities, which are linked to a broad stock market index, allow the investor to combine
protection against longevity risk with stock market exposure. Koijen et al. (2009) show that access to
variable annuities during retirement is welfare enhancing.
20substantial amount has been accumulated. We can conclude that a certain wealth level needs
to be reached before the household can purchase an annuity.
3.2.2 Life Insurance Policy Functions
In the absence of a bequest motive, there is no demand for life insurance products. In Figure
4 we can see that life insurance is (i) increasing in age so that life insurance demand rises with
age and (ii) poorer households all participate in the life insurance market and the demand for
life insurance decreases as liquid wealth rises. Thus, unlike the annuity demand schedule, life
insurance allocations of wealth decrease with higher wealth levels. This implication points
towards a prediction of the model that generally implies that annuity and life insurance
demands should be negatively correlated as, for a given annuity level, richer households tend
to mostly increase their annuity allocation and decrease their life insurance one.
3.2.3 Portfolio Choice Policy Functions
The share of wealth invested in the stock market as a function of cash on hand and age is
familiar from the literature on life-cycle portfolio choice.28 Speci￿cally, pension income is
treated like an implicit bond since it is certain and therefore the share of wealth in stocks is a
decreasing function of cash on hand since for diversi￿cation purposes the investor allocates all
￿nancial saving to the stock market. For higher levels of ￿nancial wealth to pension income,
the portfolio becomes more diversi￿ed with more riskless assets added to the portfolio but
given that there is no background risk (like uncertainty about medical expenditures) in
the model, the portfolio remains heavily invested in the stock market.29 An additional
(unreported) prediction here is that for a given level of cash on hand, a higher level of pre-
purchased annuities increases the share of wealth invested in stocks as the annuity can be
seen as an additional riskless asset.
Nevertheless, our results stress the importance of the bequest motive for asset allocation
decisions. One might think that the presence of a bequest motive acts towards making
28For instance, see Cocco et al. (2005), Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Polkovnichenko (2007).
29In fact, for low levels of risk aversion we have the well-known complete portfolio specialization in stocks
result, see, for example, Heaton and Lucas (1997).
21the horizon of the investor longer, therefore generating a higher allocation of the ￿nancial
portfolio in stocks. We show that this intuition is wrong. In our model the ￿xed state pension
(or the purchased annuity) is viewed as an implicit riskless asset. In the absence of a bequest
motive, ￿nancial wealth gets decumulated but the presence of the ￿xed pension income still
makes the portfolio heavily biased towards stocks for diversi￿cation reasons. In the presence
of a strong bequest motive, however, the household optimally does not intend to decumulate
￿nancial wealth. The present value of state pension income does get depleted, however, since
this is not determined by the preferences for bequests. Therefore, the portfolio becomes much
more balanced between bonds and stocks. The tendency to reduce stock market risk over
time exists but the portfolio might remain balanced throughout retirement in the presence
of a strong bequest motive. This analysis con￿rms the ￿ndings in Cocco et al. (2005), who
show the importance of the bequest motive in generating balanced portfolios, but we are
going to show next that this behavior can coincide with low demand for annuities.
3.2.4 Simulated Consumption and Wealth Pro￿les
Given that we have computed policy functions for annuity demands as a function of ￿nancial
wealth and given the initial observed wealth distribution in the data, we can simulate the
evolution of individual consumption, portfolio choice, annuity demand and ￿nancial wealth
for the remainder of a household￿ s lifetime. In the interest of space we do not report any
￿gures here as these will be reported later on for the ￿nal estimated parameters and can be
partly inferred from Table 5 that we discuss next.
3.2.5 Participation, Annuity Demand and Annuity Value
Given that we have computed policy functions for annuity demands as a function of ￿nancial
wealth at retirement age and given the observed wealth distribution in the data, we can
combine this information to calculate the total level of annuity demand implied by the model,
as well as the percentage of households that will participate in the annuity market. We also
calculate and report the annuity equivalent wealth (AEW) that will make an individual
without access to the annuity market indi⁄erent between purchasing the optimal annuity for
22the given preference con￿guration and economic environment or staying outside the market.30
The maximum welfare when annuities are set to zero is calculated by solving the consumer￿ s
problem by setting annuities equal to zero, giving a value function equal to V . The optimal
decision with a potentially positive annuity is given by the value function V ￿ for the ￿rst
time an annuity is purchased. We then solve for the percentage change in liquid wealth that
will equate the two value functions for a given level of wealth as
V






The AEW is therefore given by X=(X + ￿X); a number like 99% means that the household
is willing to give up 1% of its wealth to be able to purchase an annuity, that is, annuities are
welfare improving to individuals. Following the distinction we view as empirically relevant,
we also condition on the stock market participation status when presenting these results.
Table 5; Panel A, reports various annuity demand statistics for non-stockholders for di⁄er-
ent perturbations of the preference parameters (risk aversion, the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution and the bequest motive).31 Annuity market participation (column 4) reports
the percentage of households that participate in the annuity market, life insurance partici-
pation (column 5) reports the percentage of households that participate in the life insurance
market, while voluntary annuity demand (column 6) reports the average annual annuity
income in thousands of pounds conditional on participation. The last column reports aver-
age annuity equivalent wealth. Consistent with the policy function results, in the absence
of a bequest motive, life insurance participation is zero while higher risk aversion increases
annuity market participation and the total level of annuity demand.32 A stronger bequest
motive, on the other hand, generally decreases annuity demand, but not to the extent found
when life insurance is not present. A stronger bequest motive increases life insurance partic-
30This calculation follows Brown (2001).
31We use a range of preference parameters that is deemed reasonable in the literature (see, for example,
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)) and also consistent with the estimates presented
later on in the paper.
32The reported average level of voluntary annuity demand falls but the total annuity demand rises since
there are more participants now. We report this statistic because this will be more directly comparable to
the empirical section which reports per capita annuity income conditional on participation.
23ipation, which can be viewed as a negative position in annuities and therefore the bequest
motive does not crowd out annuities to the extent found when life insurance purchases are
not allowed.
The e⁄ect of a higher EIS depends on how the EIS a⁄ects total saving. This is in turn
determined by the di⁄erence between the expected rate of return and the discount rate (as
explained in Campbell and Viceira (1999)). In the current set of experiments, the discount
rate is higher than the risk free rate and therefore a higher EIS generally decreases saving and
therefore results in a lower annuity market participation and simultaneously to a higher life
insurance participation. Furthermore, as annuity demand increases, the value of annuities is
re￿ ected in a lower AEW, in the absence of a bequest motive. In the presence of a bequest
motive this is more complicated because of the change in life insurance demand. Speci￿cally,
as annuity demand increases typically life insurance participation drops. Therefore, if one
compares the b = 0 with the b = 0:1 cases, annuity market participation mostly does not
move much but the AEW moves quite dramatically re￿ ecting the big change in life insurance
demand generated by the bequest motive.
Quantitatively, the results illustrate that even in the absence of a bequest motive, there
do exist con￿gurations of parameters where the model still predicts low participation. When
￿ = 2 and   = 0:1, for instance, only 3:5% of households choose to participate in the annuity
market. This result seems very surprising given the existing literature on the annuity market
participation puzzle. What explains this ￿nding? This preference parameter con￿guration
implies a weak motive to save, the wealth distribution is skewed to the left for this group
with many poor households, while the pension system already provides a substitute for the
provision of longevity insurance. As a result, very few households choose to participate in
the annuity market. This explanation is consistent with the other ￿nding from the table that
as risk aversion increases, the insurance value of annuities rises substantially and annuity
market participation can rise up to 15:81% (for ￿ = 5 and   = 0:1). The table also illustrates
that lower annuity demand can also be generated if one is willing to admit some preference for
leaving bequests. Speci￿cally, for (￿ = 2,   = 0:1) and b = 0:1 annuity market participation
is around 3:42% for non-stockholders.
Panel B of Table 5 reports similar results for stockholders with two di⁄erences. First
24we also report the share of ￿nancial wealth in stocks since the households in the data hold
balanced portfolios (made up of both bonds and stocks). Thus, an explanation of the low
annuity take-up that simultaneously generates a complete portfolio specialization in stocks
would be explaining one puzzle at the cost of maintaining another one. Second, we expand
the range of preference parameters for which results are being reported to re￿ ect the range of
estimated parameters from the next section. Thus, the bequest parameter rises from b = 0:1
to b = 5.
The basic qualitative results are similar as for the non-stockholders￿case. Annuity de-
mand and participation are both increasing in risk aversion and decreasing in the strength of
the bequest motive. The e⁄ect of EIS is ambiguous/non-monotonic but is mostly decreasing
annuity demand (for higher risk aversion coe¢ cients). It is important to note that this is
in￿ uenced by the (endogenous) portfolio choice that determines the rate of return on the
portfolio and thus the di⁄erence between the rate of return and the discount rate. For low
levels of risk aversion the household is more aggressive and earns a higher mean return on the
portfolio, whereas this is reversed for higher levels of risk aversion. For the latter cases the
discount rate is substantially higher and therefore a higher EIS generates lower saving and
thus a lower annuity demand participation and a higher life insurance participation (when
the bequest motive is present).
3.3 Summary
We use a life-cycle model to understand both qualitatively and quantitatively the impor-
tance of preference parameters in a⁄ecting the demand for annuities. Risk aversion, the
strength of the bequest motive, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the decision
to access the stock market are key determinants of the model￿ s quantitative predictions.
Financial wealth, a key endogenous state variable in the model, is directly a⁄ected by these
parameters and is therefore a key predictor variable in assessing the model￿ s quantitative
implications. Contrary to frictionless theoretical models, there exist reasonable preference
parameter con￿gurations that generate very low annuity market participation.
254 How Deep is the Puzzle?
In this section we evaluate the extent to which the model￿ s predictions are at odds with the
data. We employ a method of simulated moments estimator to pick the structural parameters
that minimize the distance between some selected moments in the data and in the model.
Consistent with the empirical evidence from the previous sections, we separate our analysis
between stockholders and non-stockholders. The main predictions that we focus on are the
participation in the annuity and life insurance markets, and, conditional on participation,
the amount of annuity demand at retirement. For stockholders we also focus on matching
the share of wealth invested in the stock market. In the non-stockholder version of the model
we have two parameters to match three moments. Speci￿cally, we set risk aversion equal to
two and estimate the bequest parameter and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to
match the voluntary annuity and life insurance market participation rates and the average
annuity demand conditional on participation. We set risk aversion to two consistent with the
available empirical evidence for large parts of the population (Gourinchas and Parker (2002),
for instance). For the stockholders we match the same three moments plus the average share
of ￿nancial wealth allocated to stocks during retirement and use the risk aversion coe¢ cient
as the extra parameter to match the extra moment.
4.1 Non-Stockholders
Given the wealth distribution for non-stockholders at retirement as an exogenous input,
Table 6; Panel A, reports the estimated structural parameters from this procedure.33 The
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is estimated at 0:08 and there is evidence for a be-
33The parameter vector (￿) is chosen to minimize the quadratic form Argmin￿D0￿￿1D. Under regularity
conditions given in Du¢ e and Singleton (1993),
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26quest motive (0:02). Even though the bequest coe¢ cient is near zero, bequests are essential
in this model to match the life insurance participation rate in the data. The elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is consistent with studies based on intertemporal Euler equations
(Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). The predicted annuity market participation rate for this group
of households is 3:5% (versus 3:2% in the data). Conditional on participation, the annual
annuity purchased is around 4;400 GBP (1;700 GBP in the data) and life insurance partic-
ipation is 71:9% (42:2% in the data). We think that the intuition for these results is clear.
The wealth distribution for non-stockholders is concentrated very much to the left of the
wealth distribution and poor households optimally choose not to annuitize, or annuitize a
small fraction of their wealth, since pension income already provides a reasonable insurance
against longevity risk. Figure 5, Panel A, compares the wealth evolution during retirement
predicted by the model versus the one in the data, illustrating the close ￿t between the two.
Correspondingly, Panel A of Figure 6 compares the cumulative annuity and life insurance
participation between the model and the data and illustrates how annuity demand can be
well captured by the model. Life insurance participation is slightly harder to match with the
model predicting a stronger increase in participation over the remaining years of life than in
the data.
It could be argued that our results arise from certain exogenous assumptions in the model.
For instance, we use a load factor of 20% which might be considered very high. We therefore
next investigate the robustness of our conclusions to such maintained assumptions. Table 7,
Panel A, reports the results from changing these parameters while maintaining everything
else as in the estimated model. A lower pension (set at the 25th percentile) increases annuity















m(Yt) denotes the di⁄erent moments chosen, variables Y;(~ Y ) denote actual (simulated) data, T is the
sample size and TH is the total size of simulated data. Following the rules of thumb in Michaelides and Ng
(2000) we use H = 10. The derivatives are computed numerically and E is the population average (sample
analog used in the estimation). Following Pischke (1995) and De Nardi et. al (2006) we use a diagonal
matrix for weighting the moment conditions. The idea is that even though the optimal weighting matrix is
asymptotically e¢ cient, it can be severely biased in small samples. The diagonal weighting scheme uses the
inverse of the matrix that is the same as ￿ along the diagonal and has zeros o⁄ the diagonal of the matrix.
27market participation from 3:5% to 5:4%. Nevertheless, the results with regards to the three
moments of interest are still relatively close to their empirical counterparts, if one takes
into account the standard deviation of these moments in the data. We next investigate the
implications of a lower subjective survival probability (the household expects the survival
probability to be 10% lower than the objective one). This expectation drives annuity demand
down to zero but increases dramatically the demand for life insurance from 71:9% to 87%.
Thus, the expected decreased annuity demand is accompanied by the large increase in life
insurance in this comparative static emphasizing the close link between life insurance and
annuity products. We also investigate what happens when an actuarially fair annuity policy
exists. This change increases annuity participation from 3:5% to 8:8% and voluntary annuity
demand from 4;400 GBP to 4;800 GBP. One interesting comparative static involves reducing
the number of years for which an annuity can be purchased. In particular, we can set that
time to one year so that annuities can only be purchased at the time of retirement. We ￿nd
that annuitizing only once reduces annuity participation from 3:5% to 3:3%, even though
we do not include any time-varying in￿ ation or interest rate considerations in the model.
Overall, these results indicate that there is a range of possible outcomes that the model can
generate depending on exogenous assumptions, but we view as robust the basic message that
there exist preference parameters that can replicate the observed data as part of the posited
structural model.
4.2 Stockholders
We follow the same estimation procedure for stockholders but add the average share of ￿-
nancial wealth in stocks during retirement as a target and estimate the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion (￿) as well. We report the results in Table 6, Panel B. The elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution is around 0:72 and the bequest parameter equals 4:74. The level of
annuity market participation is around 13:5% (9:6% in the data), while life insurance par-
ticipation equals 63:9% (37:5% in the data). The annual annuity income equals 2;800 GBP
(3;600 GBP in the data). We view these predicted outcomes as quite close to their observed
counterparts and Figures 5, 6 and 7 illustrate how closely predicted behavior matches its
28empirical counterpart. Figure 5, Panel B, shows that in the data the mean wealth pro￿le
shows only a relatively slight trend towards decumulation over the life cycle. The model can-
not match the lack of any decumulation in wealth but we argue that given the substantial
uncertainty surrounding these pro￿les (the average of the cross sectional standard deviation
equals 90;400 GBP), the model can be a good ￿rst approximation of the data. Figure 6,
Panel B, illustrates that annuity market participation matches well with its empirical coun-
terpart, while life insurance participation is again predicted to be stronger by the model than
it is in the data. Figure 7 in turn reports the average pro￿les for the share of wealth in stocks
over the life cycle between the model and the data and balanced portfolios become a key
prediction of the model even right after retirement.34 Interestingly, the household portfolio
becomes a lot more aggressive after age 80, a prediction which is absent when access to a
life insurance market is not allowed. The presence of a life insurance product in the model
generates a very aggressive allocation to stocks as death approaches. Overall, the portfolio
is relatively aggressive compared to the data but given the lack of any other background risk
in the model, we view this graph as a relative success for the impications of the model.
In Table 7, Panel B, we o⁄er some further comparative statics to illustrate that the
conclusions are relatively robust to changes in the economic environment. A lower (25th
percentile) pension level a⁄ects the annuity market participation rate in the expected way
and roughly doubles participation from 13:5% to 25:6%, while it substantially crowds out the
participation in the life insurance market. A lower subjective survival probability reduces
mostly the amount of voluntary annuities purchased from 2;800 GBP to 1;900 GBP while
keeping the participation rates at around the same level. The two comparative statics results
that generate a large impact on the annuity market participation rate are the ones where
markets become actuarially fair (and the annuity market participation rate rises from 13:5%
to 53:5%) and when annuity purchases are only allowed to take place once (at retirement).
34A previous version of the paper ignored this dimension of the model and estimated the preference
parameters keeping ￿ = 2. The portfolio held by the household in this speci￿cation is heavily invested in
the stock market, since with the provision of reasonable pension income and a certain annuity income, the
natural prediction of the model is that households would hold stocks to have a diversi￿ed portfolio (since
annuities and pension income act implicitly like bonds/riskless assets).
29In this case annuity demand falls to 6:9%. One interesting ￿nding from these comparative
statics is that the AEW is quite high and indicates a robust demand for annuities for this
group of the population. We experimented by changing the timing of payments by assuming
that both the annuity and the state pension are part of next period cash on hand when the
agent dies (that is the agent dies after receiving the annuity and the pension). This is the
experiment labelled ￿Death Pension￿ . In this instance, there is a substantial drop in the life
insurance participation from 63:9% to 46:8% and a corresponding increase in the annuity
market participation rate from 13:5% to 17:9%. Interestingly, the AEW now rises to 97:9%
from 89:1% implying that the timing of pensions received can have a pronounced e⁄ect on
the results. Nevertheless, the main predictions that are confronted with the data are still
similar in magnitude to the ones reported in the baseline case. Overall, we interpret these
￿ndings as being supportive of the robustness of the results.
4.3 Do these Findings Square up with the Literature?
There are three types of ex-ante heterogeneity in preferences that we use to reconcile the
low take-up of annuities. The ￿rst involves a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution for
non-stockholders and a much higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution for stockholders.
Finding a low magnitude for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for non-stockholders,
and a much higher one for wealthier households, is consistent with the empirical evidence
o⁄ered in Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). Gomes and Michaelides (2005) calibrate a portfolio
choice model and argue that this type of heterogeneity can explain saving behavior and
stock market participation over the working part of the life cycle, while Gomes et al. (2009)
estimate similar preference parameters to explain wealth accumulation through tax-deferred
accounts in the U.S.. Guvenen (2006) uses this type of heterogeneity to explain the estimates
of a low elasticity in studies using aggregate data. Overall, we view our EIS estimates as
consistent with the empirical evidence.
The second type of heterogeneity we need is in risk aversion. Speci￿cally, to generate
balanced portfolios we need a higher risk aversion for stockholders than non-stockholders.
We do not need to make this assumption if instead one is willing to allow ex ante hetero-
30geneity in discount rates rather than risk aversion. Thus, we can keep the risk aversion
coe¢ cient the same across the two groups but instead decrease the discount factor for the
non-stockholders. Making the non-stockholders more impatient will counteract the higher
risk aversion and result in them decumulating wealth during retirement and demanding lower
annuities. This observationally would have the same e⁄ect as heterogeneity in risk aversion
with the same discount rate. Thus, this type of heterogeneity is not vital, assuming discount
rate heterogeneity is permitted.
The third type of heterogeneity that is necessary to match the behavior of stockholders
is the strength of the bequest motive. Most studies testing for bequest motives compare
households with and without children or use the elicited responses of households expecting
to leave inheritances and ￿nd little explanatory power for the annuitization decision (for
example, Brown (2001)). Our results indicate that perhaps combining the predictions for
another market (like life insurance) or focussing more on other implications of bequests
through a more structural model can be another way to o⁄er evidence for a bequest motive.
In particular, we think that the e⁄ect of a strong bequest motive in generating a balanced
portfolio in stocks has not been su¢ ciently stressed in the literature. Here, the bequest
motive can generate a much slower decumulation of wealth during retirement, while for the
same reason it can generate balanced portfolios. Essentially, as ￿nancial wealth gets depleted
at a slower rate than the implicit riskless assets in the form of pensions, diversi￿cation dictates
that the household holds a balanced portfolio. Cocco et al. (2005) ￿nd this e⁄ect for CRRA
preferences but they do not compare the resulting pro￿les to asset allocation pro￿les from the
data. Furthermore, the need for a bequest motive is also consistent with recent evidence like
De Nardi (2004) who emphasizes the need for a bequest motive to match the observed wealth
distribution and Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) who use this motive to better understand U.S.
wealth data during retirement. Our results are also consistent with Yogo (2008) who needs a
bequest motive to generate low welfare gains from annuity market participation in a model
with housing and health investments for the U.S. Health and Retirement Survey.
The chosen discount factor also seems low at 0.88 and is indeed on the low end of the esti-
mates in the literature. For example, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate it between 0.93
and 0.96 while a recent paper by Love (2008) that includes life insurance choices estimates
31it between 0.9 and 0.92. We think that a higher discount rate during retirement can be a
plausible mathematical representation of marginal utility shifts caused from adverse health
shocks in that period of the lifecycle. Given the recent emphasis on medical/health shocks
(for instance, Pang and Warshawsky (2007), Ameriks et. al. (2008) and Yogo (2008)) we
think that a version of the model that more explicitly deals with how health a⁄ects wealth
and in turn portfolio choice decisions may generate similar results with a slightly higher
discount factor.
5 Conclusion
We provide an in depth empirical analysis of the characteristics of households that participate
(or not) in the U.K. voluntary annuity market. We document that annuity demand increases
in ￿nancial wealth, education and life expectancy, while it decreases in pension income and
a possible bequest motive for surviving spouses. We then estimate a life-cycle model of
household portfolio choice, life insurance purchases, and annuity demand after retirement.
The model emphasizes the role of access to stock market opportunities, bequests, risk aversion
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (and through these ￿nancial wealth) as the
main determinants of annuity demand. Comparing the predictions of the model with their
empirical counterparts, we ￿nd that reasonable preference parameters can generate the low
annuity demand observed in the data. We emphasize that by assuming that all purchased
annuities are of the nominal (￿xed payout) type, we are assuming essentially an incomplete
market. According to Davido⁄ et al. (2005) we should not expect full annuitization (and
participation) in an incomplete market. We show that we can match the observed percentages
once ex ante heterogeneity in risk aversion, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and
the bequest motive is permitted.
In this paper, we focus on matching average annuity and life insurance market participa-
tion rates and the average demand for annuities conditional on participation with our model.
An ambitious future research project could try to match participation and demand statistics
along di⁄erent percentiles of the wealth and pension distribution with a more comprehensive
version of our model.
32Appendix A The Data
The ￿Income and Assets￿ module of ELSA is distributed to all ￿nancial units within a
household. A ￿nancial unit is either a single person, or a couple if the latter declares to
share their income and assets. If a couple treats their income and assets separately, it will
consist of two ￿nancial units. Since we would like to use the annuity information on the
least aggregated level, we prepare the data on a ￿nancial unit level and employ individual
speci￿c information (like age, gender, education, and health) of the person who ￿lled in the
￿Income and Assets￿module. Financial information (like wealth and income) is collected at
the household level. The ￿rst wave of ELSA comprises 12;100 individuals and our sample
consists of 5;233 households. The reduction is explained by excluding households without
a member in retirement (2;206 observations), excluding partners from couples who report
joint income and assets (3;536 observations) and excluding observations with missing values
for our variables of interest to be discussed below (1;125 observations).
Appendix B Numerical Solution
There are three state variables (age, cash on hand and purchased annuities) and four control
variables (consumption, share of wealth in stocks, in life insurance and in incremental an-


















where the evolution of the state variables is given in (3) and (4).
We solve the model recursively backwards35 starting from the last period. In the last
period (t = T) the policy functions are trivial and the value function corresponds to the
bequest function. We need to solve for four control variables in every year. For every age
t prior to T, and for each point in the state space, we optimize using grid search. From
35We use a value function approach to solve the problem (unlike the very nice exposition in Zeng (2008)
who uses an Euler equation approach).
33the Bellman equation the optimal decisions are given as current utility plus the discounted
expected continuation value (EtVt+1(:)), which we can compute since we have just obtained
Vt+1. We perform all numerical integrations using Gaussian quadrature to approximate the
distributions of the innovations to the risky asset returns. We discretize the state-space along
the two continuous state variables and use tensor product splines to perform the interpolation
of the value function for points which do not lie on the state space grid, with more points
used at lower levels of wealth where the value function has high curvature. Equivalently, we
use a more dense set of grid points for low values of wealth for the two accounts because the
consumption function exhibits a kink at the points where liquidity constraints are no longer
binding. Once we have computed the value of each alternative we pick the maximum, thus
obtaining the policy rules for the current period. Substituting these decision rules in the
Bellman equation, we obtain this period￿ s value function (Vt(:)), which is then used to solve
the previous period￿ s maximization problem. This process is iterated until t = 1.
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Notes to Table 1: The table presents the number of sample members in sub-samples defined by participation in 
the voluntary annuity market (A), the stock market (S), and the life insurance market. “A = 1” (“A = 0”) refers to 
annuity market (non-) participants in 2002 or 2004, “S = 1” (“S = 0”) refers to stock market (non-) participants 
in 2002, while “L = 1” (“L = 0”) refers to life insurance market (non-) participants in 2002. The sample consists 





   S = 1  S = 0  Total 
A = 1  213  96  309 
Col-% 9.6  3.2  5.9 
A = 0  2007  2917  4924 
Col-% 90.4  96.8  94.1 
L = 1  832  1272  2104 
Col-% 37.5  42.2  40.2 
L = 0  1388  1741  3129 
Col-% 62.5  57.8  59.8 
Total 2220  3013  5233 
Row-% 42.4  57.6  100.0 41 
 
Table 2: Financial wealth and annual income by annuity and stock market participation  
 
  All  A = 1  A = 0 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Financial  wealth  55031 15800  135017 65000 50011 14200 
Annual  pension  9328 7305  12182 9036 9149 7228 
Annual  public  pension  4796 4732 4945 4940 4787 4723 
Annual  private  pension 4532 1440 7236 3200 4362 1350 
Annual annuity income  179  0  3032  984  0  0 
Life insurance amount  17154  3000  55936  10000  15177  2532 
Stock  share  percentage  16  0 24 14 16  0 
  S = 1  S = 1 and A = 1  S = 1 and A = 0 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Financial  wealth  101937 47586  173619 99300 94330 44474 
Annual  pension  11523  9132 14142 11660 11245  8978 
Annual  public  pension  4521 4628 4943 4948 4476 4628 
Annual  private  pension 7002 4145 9199 6600 6769 4000 
Annual annuity income  351  0  3656  1200  0  0 
Life insurance amount  27523  5900  74984  10000  23027  5000 
Stock  share  percentage  38 32 35 28 38 33 
  S = 0  S = 0 and A = 1  S = 0 and A = 0 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Financial  wealth  20470  5000 49368 18420 19519  5000 
Annual  pension  7711 6315 7832 6551 7707 6304 
Annual  public  pension  4999 4784 4952 4940 5001 4784 
Annual  private  pension  2712 500  2880 693  2706 500 
Annual annuity income  53  0  1648  484  0  0 
Life  insurance  amount 10372 2000  14376 2000  10266 2000 
 
Notes to Table 2: The table presents mean and median wealth and income statistics (in GBP) and stock 
allocation percentages for the whole sample (“All”) and sub-samples defined by participation in the voluntary 
annuity market (A) and the stock market (S). “A = 1” (“A = 0”) refers to annuity market (non-) participants in 
2002 or 2004 while “S = 1” (“S = 0”) refers to stock market (non-) participants in 2002. The amount of life 
insurance is conditional on participation in the life insurance market. The sample consists of 5,233 retired 
households from the first (2002) wave of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). 42 
 
 Table 3: Socio-economic background, health and life-expectancy  
 
   All  A = 1  A = 0 
Age 69.3  68.2  69.4 
Female (%)  53  42  54 
Married (%)  56  57  56 
Number of children 2.04  1.98  2.04 
Low education (%)  59  34  61 
Medium education (%)  30  41  30 
High education (%)  11  25  9 
Survival probability (%)  52  57  52 
Objective GAD probability (%) 53  56  53 
Bad health condition (%)  19  14  19 
Medium health condition (%)  62  60  63 
Good health condition (%)  19  27  18 
  
Notes to Table 3: The table presents averages for all sample members (“All”), voluntary annuity market 
participants (“A = 1”) in either 2002 or 2004, and annuity market non-participants (“A = 0”). The sample 
consists of 5,233 retired households from the first (2002) wave of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
(ELSA). 43 
 
Table 4: Estimation results  
 
A.  Annuity market participation – Probit regressions 
 All  Non-Stockholders  Stockholders 
  estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value 
Intercept  -7.6489 -4.26 -4.0807 -1.53 -10.308 -3.87 
Age  /  10  1.3992 2.67 0.5997 0.77 1.7288 2.24 
Age
2 /  100  -0.0993 -2.65 -0.0485 -0.89 -0.1183 -2.12 
Low  education  -0.2253 -3.13 -0.2217 -2.01 -0.2095 -2.15 
High  education  0.1788 2.09 0.2132 1.15 0.1567 1.56 
Female  -0.1718 -2.62 -0.1695 -1.64 -0.1688 -1.91 
Married  -0.2944 -4.08 -0.3078 -2.62 -0.2902 -3.08 
Children  0.0444 0.56 0.1208 0.87  -0.0056  -0.06 
Life  insurance  holder  -0.0484 -0.75 -0.0728 -0.70 -0.0187 -0.22 
Survival  probability  0.1804 1.48 0.0269 0.14 0.3203 1.98 
Log  pension  -0.0204 -0.60 -0.0784 -1.41  0.0292  0.59 
Log  financial  wealth  0.1539 5.97 0.1573 5.62 0.2422 7.00 
Stockholder  -0.8350  -1.94 -  - -  - 
Stockholder x fin. wealth  0.0914  2.24  -  -  -  - 
Number of observations  5233  3013  2220 




B.  Annuity market participation – marginal effects 
 All  Non-Stockholders  Stockholders 
  estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value 
Age / 10  0.0162  1.88  -0.0035  -0.33  0.0448  2.48 
Low  education  -0.0289 -2.80 -0.0212 -1.71 -0.0437 -2.12 
High  education  0.0304 1.90 0.0287 1.02 0.0396 1.49 
Female    -0.0229 -2.36 -0.0169 -1.49 -0.0360 -1.82 
Married  -0.0359 -3.41 -0.0275 -2.13 -0.0579 -2.76 
Children  0.0069 0.57 0.0152 0.90  -0.0013  -0.06 
Life insurance holder  -0.0070  -0.75  -0.0079  -0.71  -0.0043  -0.22 
Survival  probability  0.0272 1.46 0.0031 0.14 0.0749 1.95 
Log  pension  -0.0031 -0.61 -0.0090 -1.40  0.0068  0.58 
Log  financial  wealth  0.0232 4.62 0.0180 3.58 0.0566 5.58 




C.  Conditional annuity demand – loglinear regression 
 All  Non-Stockholders  Stockholders 
  estimate t-value estimate t-value estimate t-value 
Intercept  3.9301 0.84 5.0530 0.63  -0.5309  -0.09 
Age / 10  -0.0433  -0.03  -0.7438  -0.31  0.7194  0.41 
Age
2 /  100  0.0012 0.01 0.0561 0.33  -0.0567  -0.44 
Low  education  0.0391 0.19 0.2381 0.70  -0.0804  -0.31 
High  education  -0.1086 -0.55  0.2517  0.41 -0.1236 -0.60 
Female  -0.0663 -0.37 -0.0112 -0.03 -0.1302 -0.62 
Married  0.1363 0.68 0.2310 0.70 0.0940 0.37 
Children  0.1786 0.87 0.4835 1.17 0.0848 0.35 
Life  insurance  holder  -0.1446 -0.78 -0.2622 -0.78 -0.1231 -0.54 
Survival  probability  0.3672 1.07 0.3907 0.59 0.3325 0.83 
Log  pension  -0.1197 -1.61 -0.0409 -0.40 -0.2162 -1.90 
Log  financial  wealth  0.3290 2.33 0.3213 2.11 0.6277 6.81 
Stockholder  -2.8853  -1.71 -  - -  - 
Stockholder x fin. wealth  0.2839  1.74  -  -  -  - 
Number of observations  5233  3013  2220 
R-square (in %)  22.48  14.57  22.48 
 
Notes to Table 4: Panel A reports estimation results from a Probit model for the annuity market participation 
decision. The Probit model is estimated with ML. Panel B shows marginal effects from the Probit model for a 
65-year-old single male with medium education, no children, no life insurance, average subjective survival 
probability, average pension and average wealth who does not participate in the stock market. The asymptotic 
distribution of the estimated marginal effects is computed with the delta method. Panel C contains estimation 
results from a linear regression model for the (log) annuity demand conditional on participation. The linear 
annuity demand model is estimated with OLS using a heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator of asymptotic 
standard errors. The sample consists of retired households in the first (2002) wave of the English Longitudinal 
Study of Ageing (ELSA). All regressions are computed for the whole sample and the subsamples of non-
stockholders and stockholders, respectively. 46 
 
Table 5: Average annuity and life insurance market participation and average annuity demand  
 
A.  Non-Stockholders  
         Voluntary  Life ins.  Voluntary  Annuity  
b  γ  ψ  annuity market  market  annuity   equivalent 
         participation  participation  demand  wealth 
      0.10  3.50  0.00  4.54  99.87 
 2  0.30  3.41  0.00  4.61  99.87 
   0.50  3.47  0.00  4.72  99.84 
     0.10  7.83  0.00  3.25  99.40 
0 3 0.30  7.18  0.00  3.20  99.52 
   0.50  6.18  0.00  3.38  99.53 
     0.10  15.81  0.00  2.43  98.51 
 5  0.30  12.70  0.00  2.32  99.06 
   0.50  8.38  0.00  2.93  99.01 
      0.10  3.42  76.41  4.28  93.60 
 2  0.30  3.30  80.40  4.19  89.62 
   0.50  3.37  83.88  4.12  86.50 
     0.10  7.55  75.00  3.13  89.78 
0.1 3  0.30  7.19  79.62  2.97  85.02 
   0.50  7.38  83.61  2.64  82.40 
     0.10  21.25  75.06  1.65  85.03 
 5  0.30  13.43  81.27  2.00  80.43 






B.  Stockholders 
         Voluntary  Life ins. Voluntary  Share    Annuity   
b  γ  ψ  ann. market  market  annuity   of wealth   equivalent
         participation participation demand  in stocks  wealth 
      0.20  5.09  0.00  2.29  58.37  99.87 
 2  0.50  6.29  0.00  2.89  52.84  99.79 
   0.80  13.38  0.00  2.00  47.08 99.58 
     0.20 25.90  0.00  3.76  61.40  98.46 
0 4 0.50  24.34  0.00  3.43  50.34  99.00 
   0.80  21.35  0.00  3.00  45.15 99.37 
     0.20 34.36  0.00  3.76  56.87  97.09 
 6  0.50 28.89  0.00  3.48  45.64  98.58 
   0.80  23.68  0.00  2.99  43.37 99.29 
      0.20  3.36  55.41  0.27  84.07  84.32 
 2  0.50  2.70  65.18  0.25  70.73  80.77 
   0.80 0.00  69.75  0.00  56.08 96.54 
     0.20 16.44  51.92  3.64  75.75  89.59 
5 4 0.50  11.99  54.42  2.89  70.77  87.56 
   0.80 8.89  60.18  2.32  68.31 86.79 
     0.20 26.53  57.84  3.75  68.94  91.07 
 6  0.50 18.92  60.77  2.91  65.65  89.44 
      0.80  11.93  66.12  2.77  65.14  88.75 
 
Notes to Table 5: Panel A (B) reports simulated results for the model without (with) access to the stock market, 
using the wealth distribution from the data as an exogenous input (2000 life-histories simulated). The risk free 
rate is set to 2%, the equity premium at 4% and the standard deviation of the risky asset return at 18%. Pre-
existing pension income is set at each group's median value. Comparative statics are performed over preference 
parameters in a range consistent with the estimated parameters. The bequest parameter is denoted by b, relative 
risk aversion by γ and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution by ψ. The discount factor, β, is fixed at 0.88. 
Voluntary annuity market and life insurance market participation and for stockholders, the share of wealth 
invested in stocks are reported in percentage terms, voluntary annuity demand is defined as average annual 
annuity income in thousands of pounds, conditional on participation. The annuity equivalent wealth (AEW) 





Table 6: Estimated structural parameters using the Method of Simulated Moments 
 
A.  Non-Stockholders  
            Voluntary  Life insurance  Voluntary 
Model  b  γ  ψ  annuity market  market  annuity  
            participation  participation  demand 
Estimates  0.02 2 0.08  3.5  71.9  4.4 
s.e. 0.003  ?--?  0.002      
Data      3.2  42.2  1.7 
s.d.           17.6  49.4  4.6 
 
B.  Stockholders  
            Voluntary  Life ins.  Voluntary  Share  
Model  b  γ  ψ  ann. market  market  annuity   of wealth 
            participation participation demand in  stocks 
Estimates  4.74 6 0.72  13.5  63.9  2.8  63.4 
s.e. 0.002  0.01  0.02         
Data      9.6  37.5  3.7 38.0 
s.d.           29.5  48.4  9.6  28.7 
 
Notes to Table 6: Panel A (Panel B) reports estimated parameters for the non-stockholder (stockholder) model 
using a method of simulated moments to pick the structural parameters that minimize the distance between some 
selected moments in the data and in the model. For the non-stockholders the moments are the participation in the 
annuity market, the participation in the life insurance market, and, conditional on participation in the annuity 
market, the amount of annuity demand. For the stockholders the share of wealth in financial assets is a fourth 
moment to be matched. Standard errors are computed using a diagonal weighting matrix that is based on the 
inverse of the variance of the empirical moments. In both models the preference parameters that vary are b that 
captures the strength of the bequest motive and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ). For the 
stockholder model we also vary risk aversion (γ) to match better the share of wealth in stocks. The discount 
factor, β, is fixed at 0.88. 49 
 
Table 7: Robustness of conclusions to changes in the economic environment 
 
A.  Non-Stockholders 
   Voluntary  Life ins. Voluntary Annuity   
Model  annuity market  market   annuity   equivalent 
   participation  participation  demand  wealth 
Data 3.2  42.2  1.7  - 
MSM 3.5  71.9  4.4  97.5 
Low Pension  5.4  61.5  3.7  99.4 
Low Survival  0.0  87.0  0.0  97.2 
Actuarial Fair  8.8  72.5  4.8  97.3 
Annuitize Once  3.3  71.4  1.8  99.8 
 
B.  Stockholders  
   Voluntary  Life ins.  Voluntary Share    Annuity   
Model  ann. market  market  annuity   of wealth   equivalent 
   participation  participation  demand  in stocks  wealth 
Data 9.6  37.5  3.7  38.0  - 
MSM 13.5  63.9  2.8  63.4  89.1 
Low Pension  25.6  45.4  2.4  69.0  93.9 
Low Survival  13.5  62.2  1.9  56.8  81.6 
Actuarial Fair  53.5  72.2  3.4  61.3  87.5 
Annuitize Once  6.9  65.7  2.4  63.2  91.5 
Death Pension  17.9  46.8  3.5  72.1  97.9 
 
Notes to Table 7: Panel A reports simulated results using the non-stockholder model, and Panel B the simulated 
results using stock market participants. The risk free rate is set to 2%, the equity premium at 4% and the standard 
deviation of risky asset return at 18%. Pre-existing pension income is set at each group's median value. 
Comparative statics are performed over several parameter specifications. In particular, for the MSM parameters 
are set equal to estimated parameters reported in Table 6, in the Low Pension cases the 25th percentiles of pre-
existing pension are used for each group. Low Survival is the case where individual's survival probabilities are 
reduced by 10% and Actuarial Fair is the case for annuities with a zero load factor. Death Pension describes the 
case where the individual dies after receiving the annuity and the pension. Voluntary annuity market and life 
insurance participation report average participation in each market in percentage terms, and voluntary annuity 
demand is defined as average annual annuity income in thousands of pounds, conditional on participation. The 
annuity equivalent wealth reports average AEW, which is defined as the wealth each individual is willing to give 




Figure 1: Wealth distribution, annuity market participation and annual pension income over 
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All S = 1 A = 1
 
Notes to Figure 1: The columns show the number of households (measured on the ordinate on the left hand side) 
around the 2.5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% and 97.5% percentiles of the wealth distribution in the whole 
sample (“All”) and the sub-sample consisting of stock market participants (“S = 1”). The figure shows on the 
ordinate on the right hand side the average percentage of households participating in the voluntary annuity 
market (“A = 1”) among the households located around a certain percentile of the wealth distribution. The 
sample consists of 5,233 retired households from the first (2002) wave of the English Longitudinal Study of 
Ageing (ELSA). 51 
 
Figure 2: Decomposition of annual pension income into public and private sector pension 
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Notes to Figure 2: The figure decomposes the average total annual pension income of households around a 
certain percentile of the wealth distribution into income from public pensions, private (individual or 
occupational) pensions (excluding voluntary annuities) and voluntary annuitization. The wealth distribution is 
generated to represent from the left to the right 5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 20%, 10%, 5% of the observations. 
Correspondingly, the abscissa shows the 2.5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% and 97.5% percentiles of the wealth 
distribution. The sample consists of 5,233 retired households from the first (2002) wave of the English 
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). 52 
 













































































Notes to Figure 3: This figure shows the policy functions for the share of wealth invested in annuities at age 80 
(the last year for which annuities can be purchased) for stock market participants (Stockholders) and non-


































































































































































Notes to Figure 4: This figure shows the policy functions for non-stockholders for the share of wealth invested in 
annuities and life insurance at retirement (age 65) and during the last year for which annuities can be bought (age 




Figure 5: Average wealth profiles: model and data 
 
A.  Non-Stockholders 
 
 
B.  Stockholders 
 
Notes to Figure 5: The figure plots the average age profile for wealth in the data against the model predictions 
using the baseline calibration in Table 6. The data stops at age 89 (all ages over 89 are coded as 90 in ELSA to 
avoid household identification issues) but the model has been solved on the assumption that households might 
live for a maximum of 100 years. The average standard deviation of financial wealth across age groups 65 to 89 
in the data is 90,400 GBP. 55 
 
Figure 6: Average annuity and life insurance market participation rate profiles: model and data 
 
A.  Non-Stockholders 
 
 
B.  Stockholders 
 
 
Notes to Figure 6: The figure plots the average age profiles for participation in the voluntary annuity (Annuity) 
and life insurance (Life) markets in the data against the model predictions using the baseline calibration in Table 
6. The data stops at age 89 (all ages over 89 are coded as 90 in ELSA to avoid household identification issues) 
but the model has been solved on the assumption that households might live for a maximum of 100 years. The 
average standard deviations of participation in the voluntary annuity and life insurance markets across age 
groups 65 to 89 in the data are 21% and 48%, respectively. 56 
 
Figure 7: Average portfolio allocation profiles for stockholders: model and data 
 
 
Notes to Figure 7: The figure plots the average age profile for the share of financial assets allocated to the stock 
market in the data against the model predictions using the baseline calibration for stockholders in Table 6. The 
data stops at age 89 (all ages over 89 are coded as 90 in ELSA to avoid household identification issues) but the 
model has been solved on the assumption that households might live for a maximum of 100 years. The average 
standard deviation of the share of financial wealth in stocks across age groups 65 to 89 in the data is 38%. 
 